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ABSTRACT  
 
The fact of organisational diversity leads us to put forward the paradox of « dynamic 
fit ». This serves as the basis for an alternative view of Lamarckism as applied to 
social sciences, which can provide a more efficient explanation of regular evolution 
in firms and populations. However, when a firm is trapped in a lock-in situation, 
Darwinian selection best explains how the system will behave. Thus we propose a 
continuum from alternative Lamarckism at one end, through Lamarckism, to 
Darwinism at the other end, in order to understand what evolutionary principles are 
appropriate to specific situations. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A few sentences sometimes throw up more questions than hundreds of pages in a book. This 
indeed can be said of the following extract from Allen (1994) in which the issue of 
organisational evolution is discussed: 
“Evolution selects [...] for populations with the ability to learn rather than for populations 
with optimal, but fixed behavior. This corresponds to the selection of “diversity creating” 
mechanisms in the behavior of populations, initially involving genetics, and later cognitive 
processes” (Allen 1994, 11). 
There are at least four highly important issues here which provide a framework for discussing 
the origin of organisational diversity. 
First, it is advanced that one criterion of selection among populations is the ability to learn. 
This implies that a population should be able to conduct and direct its own evolution. In the 
context of organisational theory, this stands in contrast to the neo-Darwinian ecological 
perspective (Hannan and Freeman 1977,1984, Aldrich 1979) in which populations are not 
supposed to be adaptive. In the latter view, when the environment modifies its requirements, 
the least fit are replaced by new entrants, thus freeing resources for the development of the 
fitter. Those firms which are the least fit and which are engaged in a process of evolution will 
be selected out of the market in as much as they will absorb a huge amount of resources and 
increase uncertainty in the quality of products and services, even though it is highly unlikely 
that their evolution will be completed. 
Clearly, this pessimistic view does not recognise the role of organisational learning and 
willingness. A firm is continuously subjected to variations in the environment that can be 
converted into administrative innovations leading to evolution. Rather than accepting a 
deterministic law as an explanation for inertia, we postulate that if a firm is trapped in such a 
situation then this is the outcome of a specific social process and not the result of an 
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insuperable evolutionary process, at least not in the early stages. Consequently, it is necessary 
to understand the internal process of variation-selection-retention in order to manage it. 
The question is to know what role learning plays in evolution and why a specific learning 
process will be institutionalised (or not, as the case may be). 
The second point considers that optimal behaviour in the short term will not be effective in 
the mid to long term. This is consistent with Von Foerster's conjecture that the more 
effectively the various parts are determined by the state of the whole system the less able they 
will be to influence the whole behaviour of the system. As regards our discussion, the closer 
an organisation is to the requirements of its environment in the short term, the more difficult it 
will be to evolve when that environment changes. Thus, this represents a theoretical inversion 
vis-à-vis the ecology of population theory. Here, it is the focus on short-term performance 
which is responsible for inertia, not the opposite. 
To assume that the environment selects firms which do not evolve somehow does not make 
sense. Such a phenomenon could possibly be appreciated in the short term, but selection 
processes and evolution have nothing to do with short term views. In a long term view, 
conditions evolve by definition. If a firm does not evolve, it will be sanctioned anyway. 
Thus, the problem is to understand how to remain flexible while looking for fit, i.e. how to be 
sufficiently sub-optimal in the short term in order to be more successful in the mid to long 
term. We call this problem the paradox of the dynamic fit. 
Thirdly, Allen explains that a multitude of sub-optimal behaviours combined with different 
learning processes can create a multitude of evolutionary paths leading to diversity. This 
throws up a bridge between different levels of analysis. Diversity at the population level can 
be the outcome of different types internal evolution at the firm level. But the link between 
internal and external evolution is seldom analysed, and following Madsen et al. (1997), we 
consider that “[...]few studies consider intrafirm selection and retention in conjunction with 
intrafirm variation, and connect intrafirm evolutionary processes to firm outcomes and 
competitive dynamics” (Madsen et al 1997, 3) 
It is also in a sense an appeal to recognise that the “external” process of selection is partly 
defined by the “internal” transformation of firms (Romme, 1990). Firms create their 
environment and the criteria for selection as much as they are determined by it (Weick 1979, 
Giddens 1984). These two propositions suggest that a firm has the possibility to orient the 
environment so that the latter may evolve in accordance with its path dependency, so long as 
it is willing to accept a certain amount of disequilibrium in the short term. Thus, the aim is to 
understand what conditions are most likely to allow such disequilibrium to produce effective 
administrative innovations. 
Fourthly and last of all, Allen suggests that internal evolution initially involves genetics and 
later cognitive processes. We want to lay stress on the order of that sequence. A 
recombination of existing routines (considered as genetic assets) can produce an innovative 
procedure (Usher, 1954) in the same way as grammar can combine words differently in order 
to give a different meaning to a sentence (Pentland and Rueter, 1994). Therefore, the process 
is also cognitive. A routine cannot always be perfectly duplicated, even in the firm where it 
was invented.  
“The idea of flexible schemes entails that the actor is not a passive entity, acting according to 
a scheme of unambiguous instructions as if he is dummy and the scheme is his ventriloquist” 
(Khalil, 1998, 37). There are at least three important implications in this.  
First, people can either be affected by the ambiguity of routines and make errors, or they can 
take advantage of that ambiguity if they have asymmetrical control over the information. 
Second, people tend to modify the existing system not only because it has become objectively 
worse, but also because their expectations or their appreciation of the state of the world have 
changed. As a result, the incentive to evolve can be endogenous and not exclusively 
exogenous.  
Third, if innovation is always a disruptive event of one kind or another, a new item must be 
compliant with the “deep structure” of the firm (Gemmil and Smith, 1985), that is to say, the 
shared understanding of the values of the firm. This is a condition for innovations to be 
institutionalised at the organisational level. 
 
So, these four themes which we have inferred from Allen lead us to question what 
organisational change is at the level of the population of firms and how it depends on their 
internal evolution. 
We shall seek to clarify this point by representing organisational evolution through a model of 
self-organising dissipative structures which is adapted to the social sciences. This model 
contests the Darwinian Ecology of Population theory but is also an alternative to the 
Lamarckian Evolutionary theory of economic change 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
TOWARD AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF LAMARCKISM. 
 
Evolutionary theories of economic change (Nelson and Winter, 1982, Dosi et al., 1990) have 
integrated Schumpeterian evolutionary theory in a meaningful cognitive paradigm for a major 
reconsideration of the nature of the firm and the way in which it evolves. 
It is advanced that the legitimacy of the firm as a social organisation is rooted primarily in 
human nature and not in the inadequacies of the market. Human nature is characterised first 
of all by bounded rationality and limited cognitive abilities. Each human being has to rely on 
procedural devices conveniently labelled routines in order to maintain his or her 
performance above a psychological satisfaction threshold (Cyert and March 1963). According 
to the problemistic search principle suggested by Herbert Simon, new learning is developed in 
contact with the environment if performance is below this threshold. When a solution is 
discovered it constitutes a new routine which replaces the former. Thus there is a creative-
destructive process inside the firm which serves as a basis for Lamarckian Transformism. 
Obviously, we are here in the field of exosomatic organs of human beings, i.e. tools, 
technology, routines organisations, etc., i.e. artefacts they have built. What is generally 
considered as true for the endosomatic evolution of these individuals can be prove wrong 
when we study their exosomatic organs [Georgescu Roegen, 1978]. 
Organisations are then considered as being made up of interconnected routines which are 
assimilated to genetic assets and represent the sum total of organisational learning (Nelson, 
1994). This definition of an organisation is different from that given by the ecology of 
population approach and is becoming that which is the most widely accepted in the relevant 
literature. By way of an example, Amburgey and al. [1993] propose following Hannan and 
Freeman in defining organisations as structured systems of routines embedded in a network of 
interactions with the environment, but they insist that they go beyond this model and integrate 
theories of learning and innovation. 
Members of a firm can inherit the knowledge previously developed by others and are able to 
produce new learning from this base. But that limits the array of opportunities for 
organisational evolution. The ability of a firm to distance itself from current routines depends 
on its "absorptive capacity", which in turn depends on previously acquired organisational 
competencies. As a consequence, routines and knowledge are linked together in a dynamic 
relationship according to a structuration perspective (Giddens, 1984). This social process is an 
unbroken productive loop where outputs have an impact on those who produced them (Morin 
1991). Such local mobility is very different in nature from the inhibiting inertia exposed by 
the ecology of populations theory. On the contrary, such relative inertia is a condition for the 
movement to be sustained in as much as it shields the firm from inconsistent variations that 
could create a chaotic trend (Heiner 1983, 1988).  
Differentiation becomes a cumulative and irreversible process which increases the divergence 
of trajectories and thus the organisational diversity at the population level. 
Therefore Nelson and Winter tend to consider that the orientation of trajectories is objectively 
driven by the searching process. Routines are replaced thanks to a second level of routines 
(double loop learning) which represent the way the firm has learned to learn at a third level 
(“deutero learning”) (Bateson 1977) but there is no mention of the social process that yields 
the routines. 
The authors recognise that a dominant coalition is able to inhibit any new solution promoted 
by an entrepreneur, as already stressed by Schumpeter, but nothing is said either about the 
social conditions which allow routines to develop or about the process of institutionalisation. 
Routines seem to resemble social truces and nothing is suggested in order to explain what 
precedes and what follows the elaboration of these peaceful rules. Following Coriat and 
Weinstein (1995) we may wonder if it is "...possible to define the closely related concepts of 
organisational competencies and the firm without taking into account the conflicts of which 
(these routines) are the expression, the stakes and the outcome" (Coriat and Weinstein, ibid., 
142, our translation) 
In this context, we should like to reconsider the work of Jean Baptiste Pierre Antoine de 
Monet, Chevalier de Lamarck (1744-1829) in the social sciences on the basis of two major 
points: first, the capacity of a system to be creative and not solely adaptive,  and, second, the 
role of willingness. We believe that this is the basis for an alternative model of social 
Lamarckism which goes much further on the subject of endogenous evolution. 
Firstly, Lamarck assumes in his major work, Zoological Philosophy, that all species derive 
their energy from heat and electricity. But he proposes distinguishing between the primitive 
and the higher animals. The former rely on their environment to obtain that energy and their 
behaviour is therefore mechanically determined. On the other hand, the higher animals are 
supposed to be able to generate their own heat and electricity, and therefore to achieve a 
measure of self-determination. 
 
Proposition 1: As far as economic and organisational evolution is concerned, we consider that 
Lamarckism as alluded to by the Evolutionary theory of economic change is consistent with 
the proposition concerning the adaptive primitive animals. Therefore, we can assume that an 
alternative view of Lamarckism, which is consistent with the supposed evolution of the higher 
animals, can also be proposed for organisations. 
 
This position can be seen as related to recent models of self-organising dissipative structures 
(Allen 1988, 1994; Gemmil and Smith 1985; Smith and Comer 1994). 
In both situations, the role of energy in the natural world is played by resources in the context 
of the firm. Thus, in the first proposition the firm is completely dependent on its environment 
for obtaining the essential resources to produce and to evolve in accordance with that 
environment. In the second, the environment is not considered as exogenous. Thus, the firm 
constructs its surroundings as well as being determined by them. This means that a group of 
people in a firm can also find resources inside the organisation to produce new solutions 
(technologies, routines, etc.) which can affect the environment. 
We believe that this distinction is consistent with the second and third categories of the 
typology that Jantsch (1980) proposes for dynamic systems. These include: 
− the deterministic Newtonian dynamics, 
− the equilibrium dynamics of an adaptive open system, 
− the “out-of-equilibrium” dynamic of self-organising dissipative structures. 
We do not wish to argue that in the third case a firm is solely innovative, but there is a 
balance between innovation and adaptive exploitation (March 1991). The problem is to 
determine the conditions for the sustainability of this balance, which we do not consider as a 
given. 
The second difference between Lamarckism and evolutionary economics concerns the role of 
willingness. In this respect, we need to come back to a misinterpretation of the driver of 
evolution suggested by Lamarck himself. In the first third of the 19th century, scientists 
criticised Lamarckian analysis for claiming that desire and intent were the main drivers of 
evolution. In fact, Lamarck was talking about need as driver of evolution, and it is this correct 
interpretation that is to be taken into account in evolutionary economics. 
Therefore, in order to explain, from a Lamarckian perspective, how innovation emerges from 
the deep parts of the firm and why and how it may or may not be routinised, we propose to 
come back to this initial misinterpretation. We shall consider that the drivers of evolution are 
a combination of need, intent and desire, and that these drivers can be in conflict with each 
other. For example, an organisation may need to evolve in order to fit the environment better, 
but the desire or intent of members or groups within the firm can impede this evolution. 
We assume that organisational learning is better understood when combined with the notions 
of power and bargaining. First, learning occurs among people but also among people and 
events, thus providing a situated learning context (Lant 1998). This means first that 
established artefacts such as routines do influence the learning process. Second, learning does 
not only take place in the minds of individuals but also in their interactions. If we consider 
learning as a product of interactions, and if we admit that power doesn’t exist by itself but in 
interactions among people (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977) then we can posit that learning can 
be affected by social matters. 
Consequently, we suggest substituting the learning approach developed by Argyris and Schön 
(1978) for that used by Nelson and Winter, which still relies on mechanistic principles. In the 
former approach, a firm is not able to collectivise all the competencies the members have 
learned. The issue is not only about how the search process is activated but what form the 
internal process of selection takes when more than one type of experimentation challenges the 
same routine. What conditions are required for an innovation to replace a previous routine 
and, conversely, what can explain the preservation of the status quo? 
 
SELF-ORGANISATION AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONALISATION 
 
Self-organisation has become a commonplace for the social sciences, and the literature on this 
theme has been increasing since the late 1980’s, but we believe that the work of Woodward 
(1965) is consistent with a particular kind of dynamic equilibrium of self-organisation. 
A self-organising system is able to go beyond its physical or mental limits without the need 
for any external driver (Jantsch, 1981). The core process is creation and not adaptation. When 
a variation occurs, there is a break with the self-referential values of the system. This 
variation can be the result of “order by fluctuation” (new solutions tend to contest the 
established system easily) or “order by noise” (mistakes made in an ambiguous situation lead 
to sense-making and organisation). There is a continuous conflict between the forces of self-
organisation and self-reference. A stable system does not mean that such forces are not in 
conflict within the system but that the self-referential backloops are strong enough to inhibit 
the contesting fluctuations. 
The operational characteristics of a self-organising system can be considered as follows (as 
adapted from the work of Nonaka et al., 1988): 
− widely defined goals, which reinforce the cohesion of members (Lindblom, 1965, Quinn 
1980); 
− ambiguity of interpretations are considered as a regular characteristic because they favour 
the diversity and complementarity of mental frameworks (holographic memory, Morgan 
and Ramirez, 1983); 
− direct and shared information among members of the group, (no uncertainty absorber as 
proposed for the M form by Thompson 1967); 
− the deliberate delaying of a decision is accepted when the relevant information has not 
been found by the group itself and is thus not considered as credible (Heiner 1988); 
− an avoidance of excessive specification of tasks and routines in order to favour innovative 
behaviours (Allen 1994); 
− shared responsibility for success or failure as a basis for commitment (Miles et al. 1997). 
Therefore the role and importance given to self-organising systems are substantial in the field 
of social sciences. By way of an example, Miles et al. (1997) state that self-organisation 
belongs to a new organisational design the cellular form adopted by firms preparing their 
entry into the 21st century. This new design is characterised by self-organisation, 
entrepreneurship and joint-member ownership of assets and resources. It is the outcome of a 
progressive evolution of the previous major organisational designs, i.e. the functional, 
multidivisional, matrix and, more recently, the network organisations. 
If this trend can’t be contested, we can object that a given design does not automatically 
replace a previous one or at least not so quickly.  
We can cite numerous examples of firms combining two or more of these features. The 
French Post Office combines heavy hierarchical structures with small autonomous groups, 
while Aerospatiale combines the M form (one branch for each aeronautical speciality), the 
matrix form (functional departments and project teams), and the cellular form (in order to 
develop new technologies or conduct a crash programme), while some groups can even be 
considered as small business units. 
Thus, the issue of endogenous change has to take into account the following two points:  
 
First, we suggest that it is not only a question of understanding how an innovation is 
produced (variation), but why (selection), and how this innovation is or is not institutionalised 
(retention). What we are considering here is precisely the transfer of an administrative 
innovation from one organisational design structure to another situated on a different 
hierarchical level. This does not mean that we suppose the firm to be ambidextrous (Duncan 
1976), since we will see that there is a place for innovation at each stage of the model, from 
variation to retention. The retention process is not pure assimilation and, in the words of 
Piaget (1979), does necessitate accommodation,. 
Secondly, a group can find resources both “outside” the organisation and in the internal 
environment. Thus, evolution as a transformation of energy (resources) is consistent with the 
second law of thermodynamics and can be considered endogenous. Each level tends to look 
for resources situated at the next level. An organisation doesn’t evolve as a whole, but is 
confronted with internal and local variations which may or may not be institutionalised. 
Institutionalisation is defined here as a common acknowledgement that a new administrative 
device is efficient and legitimate, and can thus become a routine. This process of 
institutionalisation, which will be developed in the fourth part of the model, is considered as 
means of allowing organisational learning. 
 
In order to respond to this particular issue, we aim to develop a multi-level model concerning 
people, groups, networks and finally the organisation as a whole. This is why we stress the 
institutional forces in action between these different levels to explain endogenous evolution as 
a fluctuating, unpredictable and non-deterministic process. 
 
THE EFFECTS OF AMBIGUITY ON INTERACTION 
 
Before developing the model, it is important to define which paradigm applies to interactions 
in the firm. In order to explain this, we can consider Meyerson and Martin’s classification 
(1987) of three paradigms differentiated according to the amount of ambiguity they are able 
to tolerate. The first paradigm is called “integration” and assumes that ambiguity should not 
exist because of its negative impact on organisational cohesion (OD, cultural management, 
etc.). The normative consequence is that managers should eliminate ambiguity.  
The second, which is called “differentiation” assumes that ambiguity does exist between the 
different decentralised and differentiated parts of the firm but not inside the groups where the 
first paradigm can be retained (contingency models, new institutional economics, etc.). 
Managers have to channel the ambiguity in interdepartmental relations in order to control it.  
Finally, the third paradigm, called “ambiguity’, assumes that ambiguity is produced by the 
social relationships in the firm and cannot be eliminated (Scott, 1978). In addition, ambiguity 
should not be eliminated because it explains a great deal of emergent evolution. 
Organisational evolution has its roots in that complexity. This implies that the predictability 
inherent in the previous models is not applicable here. Fluctuation and unpredictability are 
mainly caused by ambiguity in social interactions, and the evolutionary vision that we are 
developing is consistent with the third paradigm. 
 
A SOCIAL MODEL OF DISSIPATIVE STRUCTURES 
 
THE MOTORS OF CHANGE 
 
We consider that intra-organisational evolution follows an internal variation-selection-
retention process which is not necessary self-sustaining. We shall seek to develop a self-
organisation model of dissipative structures (Nicolis and Prigogine 1977, Prigogine 1981) in 
the same spirit as Gemmill and Smith (1985) where the creation of variety comes both from 
natural selection and dissipative (endogenous) change. 
“Dissipative self-organisation implies a system change that takes shape within turbulent 
conditions through the breakdown and rebuilding of a structural arrangement. When a system 
is operating far from its equilibrium parameters and when certain key processes are present 
and reinforced such a change can occur” Smith (1986, 204)  
We are therefore less confident in the “natural” aspect of the selection process and we shall 
consider this point while seeking to identify the drivers for evolution. Following the typology 
elaborated by Van de Ven and Poole (1995) we should like to identify the different "motors" 
which operate in this composite model. 
In order to epitomise these four ideal-type theories of social change we shall adopt the key 
metaphor and logic approach put forward by the authors : 
− Life cycle. Key metaphor: Organic growth; Logic : Immanent programming, prefigured 
sequences, compliant adaptation; 
− Evolution. Key metaphor: Competitive survival; Logic : Natural selection among 
competitors in a population; 
− Dialectic. Key metaphor: Opposition, Conflict; Logic : Contradictory forces, thesis, 
antithesis, synthesis; 
− Teleology. Key metaphor: Purposeful co-operation; Logic : Envisioned end state, social 
construction, equiifinality. 
These four motors operate at different levels and are associated differently during each stage 
of the self-organising process.  
Together they explain evolution as the outcome of human actions and intents, which are just 
as responsible for its fragility as for its endurance. In other words, the process is social and 
subjective and not natural and objective. 
Finally, the effective evolution of any trajectory is a function of the retention process. This 
depends on which among the new competing solutions the system is able to institutionalise. 
On a regular basis, the system will probably accept options which are in resonance with the 
"absorptive capacity" of the firm (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), therefore the organisation can 
be trapped in a position where no new solution can be institutionalised. This failure of internal 
innovation is supposed to be a function of the intensity of the previous organisational fit 
achieved by the firm before the environment changed. 
 
STRUCTURAL ASSUMPTIONS 
 
Consistent with the theoretical framework we posit the following structural assumptions: 
 
Assumption 1 : For each of the stages of the model we posit that a specific sociological 
system will drive the interactions between people. These systems are wrongly considered to 
be incompatible (Alter, 1996). 
Assumption 2 : Each stage can be more specifically characterised by a particular form of 
ambiguity which plays a specific role in the innovation process.  
Assumption 3 : Three levels of learning are comprised in that model, i.e. individual learning 
(1st step) collective learning in groups (3rd step) and, at the higher level of the system, 
organisational learning (4th step). 
Assumption 4 : The four motors of change identified by Van de Ven and Pool (1995) operate 
in the process. They act at different levels and are associated differently according to each 
step1.  
 
A STAGED PROCESS 
 
The model consists of four stages which, in the literature on dissipative structures, are usually 
named “disequilibrium”, “symmetry breaking”, “system experimentation” and “boundary 
repairing”. The first two are associated with dissolution and the latter two more closely 
associated with creation. Steps one and two can partially overlap as can steps three and four.  
The staged model goes through these four steps according to a life-cycle structure. That is to 
say that an innovation imagined from a variation at the first step tends irrepressibly to go to 
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 Note : We will note LC for life cycle, T for teleological, D for dialectical and E for evolutionary. We will indicate 1 when 
the motor operates at the individual level, 2 at the group or network level, 3 at the organisational level. 
the next step.This is consistent with the Schumpeterian view that an entrepreneur is always 
motivated to institutionalise his or her innovation or his or her project. 
This does not mean that each period of the four steps will be completed or that an innovation 
will be institutionalised. Innovation can progress toward institutionalisation at each step or 
can end in deadlock because of the nature of the social forces. 
 
Assumption 5 : The common motors for the whole process are LC3 and E3 
This means that a second motor is deeply related to the first one and can contradict the forces 
in action i.e. the evolutionary motor. The latter can prevent the life cycle from progressing or, 
on the contrary, it can favour its passing on to the next stage. 
 
Step 1: Disequilibrium 
 
By disequilibrium we mean an unstable state where a gap exists between specified procedures 
and practices, thus creating uncertainty.  
In that sense, a variation (the gap between procedures and practices) in itself is not sufficient 
to create disequilibrium. The variation should give members of the group the opportunity to 
act in a way which is not expected by the whole organisation, and this produces uncertainty 
about the quality of the outcome and about the co-ordination of the modified procedure with 
others. In an express delivery company a group of sellers found themselves with sudden and 
aggressive competition on prices while the management stuck to its opinion that prices were 
not to be decreased in order to signal the constant quality of the service offered. In order to 
maintain the number of new contracts (taken into account for the determination of salaries), 
the sellers established an unofficial system encouraging the customers to announce higher 
levels of delivery than they could ever achieve in order to obtain officially better rates. The 
proportion of forecast over effective deliveries was increasing and the sellers cited the high 
uncertainty of the economic climate of the time as an explanation. Although far from 
convinced by this explanation, top managers nevertheless considered the situation to have 
become irrevocable. Members gained a degree of freedom even within the context of highly 
specified routines. 
This illustrates the dilemma existing between organisation and innovation, order and disorder. 
The organisation tends to reduce uncertainty by progressive routinisation (Perrow 1970), but 
innovation is the art of taking advantage of this uncertainty. We shall call innovation this 
association of variation and intent. 
In this step, all four motors are engaged in producing change in the organisation from two 
kinds of variations, one created by an entrepreneur and the other by an actor. 
First of all, firms are used to accumulating more knowledge than their current operations 
require (Miles et al, 1997). We call this surplus "joint knowledge" in order to stress that it is 
produced out of daily practices. Entrepreneurs, therefore, are those people who can transform 
this knowledge into an innovation. 
By way of an example, R&D engineers are used to devoting a significant part of their time to 
verifying whether different hypotheses satisfy their current and specific problem(s) or not.  
“In order to find a solution we need to open dozens of doors only to verify that what is behind 
them is not appropriate to our problem” reports a chief engineer in a French aerospace 
company.  
The rooms whose doors are opened and closed contain this kind of joint knowledge. 
Obviously, there is a potential disequilibrium only if someone takes an interest in reopening 
one of these doors and making sense of that knowledge. 
This source of innovation is driven by an LC1 motor in as much as this joint knowledge is 
produced during the life cycle of technologies, products and also administrative routines. 
Secondly, this modification of internal conditions can also be produced by members 
considered as actors. These actors are motivated by their personal strategies and are able to 
deviate from official prescriptions even in controlled systems such as bureaucracies (Crozier 
1963). There is a life-cycle motor which explains that the more used to a routine people are, 
the better they control it. And the better they control it, the more likely they are able to 
develop an idiosyncratic behaviour, different from that which is specified. An LC1 motor, not 
very different in nature from the previous one, is also at work here. 
The more information people control, which is not shared by their immediate superiors, the 
more power they have. This power gives them the opportunity to develop a gap between 
official and effective practices.  
The concept of routine, consistent with this proposition, is closer to that proposed by Argyris 
and Schön (1978) than by Nelson and Winter. For the former a divorce is possible between 
"espoused theories" and "theories in practice". 
Actors take advantage of ambiguity and create or maintain a state of disequilibrium (March 
and Olsen 1976). Ambiguity is assimilated with instability and is necessary for people to 
innovate. People have a margin of power and can negotiate their operating methods with their 
hierarchy, and this can be a source of new behaviours which afford them greater facility in 
reaching their goals (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977). A D1 motor is at work here. 
Finally, E1 and T1 motors are also included in this step. People have to select which of the 
variations they are experimenting with is worth being pursued (selection) and established 
(retention). 
It is not because extra knowledge has been produced that it will be transformed into an 
innovation. From a Lamarckian point of view, we consider that this variation has to be 
activated by an intent.  
Members move away from equilibrium if they do not achieve their goals or if they reconstruct 
their expectations. This developmental and unpredictable path is characteristic of the 
teleological motor (Van de Ven and Pool, ibid.) 
Assumption 6 : The LC1 and D1 motors are closely interrelated in disequilibrium. Owing to 
the information and knowledge produced by LC1, a specific dialectical action is possible 
(D1), and because members have their specific goals they are motivated to practice their 
routines in such a way as to control more information and knowledge (LC1). E1 and T1 are 
intermediary motors between LC1 and D1 and allow members to select the more interesting 
variation (E1) and make sense with the knowledge or information they control (T1) 
This kind of disequilibrium can be revealed and managed if top managers allow people to talk 
openly of their dissent. This does not necessarily mean that the process is under control, as 
Burgelman showed in the case of Intel (1994). 
 
Step 2: Symmetry breaking 
 
Symmetry breaking can be provoked by the evolution of coalitions which modify the system 
of power. The modification of coalitions is necessary for the system to be unblocked and for 
the challenging innovation then to have a chance of being shared by others (Friedberg, 1993). 
Social actors are not just individuals. Members join and create coalitions (Thompson 1967). 
People and groups reconsider the way of attaining their objective when their actions during 
the most recent period have not been effective. This provides an opportunity to contradict the 
previous dominant coalition. T1 and T2 motors are at work here, depending on the level on 
which this search is considered 
This suggests that people do not have a clear idea of their preferences, that they are not 
directly affected by the subject at hand. They can contribute to contesting or reinforcing 
routines out of political considerations and join the coalition only because it will be useful in 
the future when they look for members to join their own coalition. These variations can occur 
for various reasons, and at many different moments, and are difficult to forecast, even to 
explain afterwards (March and Olsen, 1976).  
If an entrepreneur possessing surplus knowledge or an actor trying to modify a procedure are 
regarded as opportunities to reinforce a coalition even for a while, they can be supported. 
Slack and rare resources such as attention or money can be oriented to them. There is a kind 
of selection in operation here an E2 motor and there is no guarantee that this selection is 
objective according to any criteria of efficiency.  
Assumption 7: the E2 motor is closely related to the T1 and T2 motors in symmetry breaking. 
The evolutionary process which will provide resources for a specific innovation is coherent 
with the need of people or of groups to find a new solution in order to attain their own goals. 
Ambiguity as regards goals favours complex strategic attitudes and explains why a dominant 
coalition can be deposed. If everything were clear and rational, it would be more difficult to 
modify the positions in the field. 
This gives a good idea of what an upheaval zone of punctuated dynamics can be in the social 
sciences and why it does or does not appear. 
When symmetry breaking does not occur, this means that the system is not socially prepared 
for change even if there are plenty of good and rational reasons to change. In such a case there 
is no window for change. 
 
Step 3: System experimentation 
 
People can mobilise themselves for an idea or a project without calculating their personal 
interest. This enables sociologists to explain how certain people, for example, can join a 
strike. They have no personal interest in doing so in as much they could lose credit with their 
superiors, and if the strike is a success, each employee, whether on strike or not, will benefit 
from the results. They join the group on strike because of the usual pressures, or they may 
fear sanction from the group. It might also be because they want to participate in the stories 
their parents told them about the « glorious » strikes of the past. 
This is an alternative to the strategic approach of the actor considered in the first steps, but 
these two conceptions of actors should not be considered as incompatible (Alter 1996). 
In the case of our discussion, the group resulting from this mobilisation can be physically 
constituted in particular, thanks to the resources obtained during the symmetry breaking 
stage or otherwise it can be a network of members interacting on the subject. This second 
perspective is more appropriate for understanding informal experimentation. 
Experimental innovation in a group is the first stage in creating a common competency, but it 
is still a collectively shared competency and does not yet represent organisational knowledge.  
The group tends to develop a new regulation system "in the making" which opposes the 
established regulation system. This new self-regulation system concerns methods, the sharing 
of tasks, the way of introducing a new product or  new technology. For this reason, the main 
motor is T2, since the creativity of the self-organising group is devoted to attaining its own 
goals. 
It is important to understand how the self-regulation of a group comes into conflict with the 
regulation system of the firm (Reynaud and Reynaud 1994). This opposition between two 
modes of regulation will favour or inhibit collective innovation. 
A control system tends to channel the actions undertaken by the group, and the latter will try 
to promote the new procedures at the system level. 
The system can totally inhibit self-regulation or, on the contrary, leave the groups free to 
experiment at the system level. There is also a third solution, called "joint regulation" by 
Reynaud and Reynaud, which can emerge out of negotiation between the two levels. D2/D3 
motors are at work here in as much as this opposition can force one of the two parties to 
evolve or force both parties to find a new compromise 
As proposed by March (1991), the system should be able to show a balanced situation 
between exploitation and exploration. Too much exploration can lead the firm to 
meaninglessness, as can be seen from Heiner’s model of decision-making.  
Gradual evolution shields members from inconsistent exploration when uncertainty 
overwhelms their understanding (Heiner 1983, 1988). 
An important point in Heiner’s model is that uncertainty creates a gap between imperfect 
information about the state of the world and the ability to take decision. This is a justification 
for pursuing credible routines of the past for a while in what seem to be similar 
circumstances. Credibility is defined as a past ability to meet a requisite level of performance. 
It is more intelligent than trying to innovate at any cost, because cumulative errors can be 
made. 
These routines maintain the credibility expected by members of the inter-organisational 
network in spite of increasing uncertainty. 
Above a certain level of C-D gap, inertia is more efficient than innovation. That means that 
inertia is part of the whole process of evolution and it can preserve the firm from being 
eliminated. “Problemistic search” and “satisfacing” are presented by Heiner as current rules. 
Maximisation becomes a rare and extreme case where the C-D gap doesn’t exist. 
Assumption 8 : Two motors are at work in system experimentation. First, the T2 motor which 
explains the adaptive behaviour of the self-organising group looking for ad hoc solutions. 
Second, the D2/D3 motors which guide the opposition between the two levels. Obviously 
these motors are closely related. The more innovative and powerful the ideas the group 
develops, the stronger the opposition will be. Conversely, the more powerful the system is, 
the less motivated the group will be to produce major innovations. 
 
Step 4: Boundary repairing 
 
So far, a number of actors have developed a questioning attitude to a particular behaviour 
(disequilibrium), then some of the members have had to notice this in order to allocate some 
slack resources (symmetry breaking) which are necessary for the group to turn this idea into a 
practical innovation. This innovation can contest established routines (system 
experimentation). But now innovators have to convince most members that their solution is 
legitimate and they have to convince top managers in order to have their innovation 
transformed into an institutionalised routine.  
Sociologists concerned by innovation suggest that the best way to legitimise a new routine 
and to unite people around it is to "translate" the problem gradually in order to obtain 
agreement on it (Callon 1986). This will help promote the solution, as happened in one of the 
main public transportation companies in France. A new set of project management practices 
designed to orient relations between the functional teams and the project team were gradually 
elaborated within an experimental group. The diffusion of these practices was possible only 
after a long period of discussion (6 months in this case) during which several translations of 
the problems solved by the new practices were carried out. During the process these practices 
were accommodated in order to be adopted by each new organisational level. This means that 
this phase is not only a question of assimilation but also of accommodation. 
This translation process is critical because entrepreneurs and actors have to prove that the 
innovation is consonant with the accumulated learning and experience of the system (Cohen 
and Levinthal 1990). Obviously, an E3 motor is at work here owing to this variation 
(accommodation) in the selection and retention process. 
In order to be institutionalised the innovation has to fit the "deep structure" of the firm i.e. its 
self-referential framework: “Self-reference implies some form of reflection within which the 
group arrives at a shared understanding of its values, its purpose, and desired future” (Smith 
and Comer, 1994). 
There will be conflict and a trade-off between the internal fit (self-referential framework) of 
an innovation and its external fit (with the environment). The former should not be sacrificed 
to the latter. This is a condition of preserving dynamic flexibility. If the internal fit is affected 
by the search for external fit, the cumulative learning process could be interrupted and 
subsequent evolution made impossible. This is a structural explanation for the dynamic fit 
which could lead to an irrevocable position (Khalil, 1997). According to Goergecu-Roegen, 
Khalil dissociates “the irreversible change where objects can return to any previously attained 
phase but not by following the same course phase by phase in the reverse order [to the] 
irrevocable change [which] involve processes that cannot pass through a given state more 
than once” Khalil (1997) quoting Goergecu-Roegen (1971). Dissipative structures are 
responsible for irrevocable evolution while Lamarckism in evolutionary economics is 
concerned by irreversible change.  
 
Proposition 2 : When the internal fit is sacrificed for the external one, the evolution process is 
not only affected in its ability to institutionalise new solutions but also in the quality of new 
variations. If the process of continuity can explain a gradual attraction toward a specific 
position, such renunciation of the self-referential framework can explain the lock-in 
phenomenon. 
 
This idea of translation can be found in the field of politics. It relates to the political attitude 
conceptualised by Lindblom (1959) where it is crucial for politicians to give the widest 
meaning to their project in order to attract a greater number of sympathisers. They must refine 
this project with these people while trying to obtain a consensus in order to create a new 
powerful coalition. 
This “unavoidable” ambiguity of strategies is precious in negotiations between people who 
can evolve in their preferences during the process itself (Baier, March and Saetren, 1968). If 
ambiguity is seen as being incompatible with innovation for the rational decision-making 
paradigm it appears here as a strength for the institutionalisation of innovation. In fact, 
strategic change is clearer in retrospect than during the period when it is taking place 
(Burgelman, 1994). A certain amount of ambiguity serves the institutionalisation of 
innovation. 
Translation represents a kind of boundary repairing (Smith and Comer, 1994) designed to 
form a new community sharing the same values (Lant 1998). This process refers to a T3 
motor. 
Assumption 9: The E3 and T3 motors are in operation at the translation level. This step is a 
critical element in institutionalisation i.e. the retention of innovation, and the success of this 
retention will depend on the ability of the group to define new convenient boundaries around 
the community. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
THE RECONCILIATION OF PUNCTUATED AND GRADUAL EVOLUTION 
 
This model provides new insights into an old discussion about the rhythm of change. Some 
defend a incremental approach (Quinn, 1980) while others consider that change occurs 
because of disruptive events. Greiner (1972) associates these two features in a cyclical 
movement during the growth of a firm whereas others regard it as a Kuhnian process 
(Sheldon, 1980, Miller 1981) where the need to change is found in the coming of a new 
organisational paradigm. Most researchers consider that radical change is more effective than 
the gradual way and suppose that it represents the only opportunity to break through the 
cohesive organisational assets established during the inertia period (Miller and Friesen, 1980). 
By the same token, Hannan and Freeman (1977, 1984), and Aldrich (1979), in a less radical 
view, explain that, because of the cohesion of these organisational assets and because the 
market expects a constant level of quality, an effective organisational change cannot be a 
success. Firms should never undertake such transformations. New designs will be established 
by new entering firms. 
Finally, from a Darwinian perspective, Singh et al (1986) state that evolution and revolution 
are not experienced alternatively, but simultaneously, in different places of the firm. The core 
follows drastic modifications but the periphery experiences a gradual adaptation. Darwin 
suggested a model where the phenotypes evolved gradually, but not the genotypes. The 
modern synthesis of the Darwinian perspective has suggested that genotypes underwent 
radical and hazardous change. 
 
Proposition 3: An alternative approach where both gradual and punctuated transformations 
can be experienced at different levels of the system is possible. Going further still, we can 
assume that the one can explain the other.  
 
The gradual evolution of an organisational species can be understood as produced by a 
punctuated transformation of populations which themselves are explained by a long 
maturation of firms considered as individuals (Nelson and Winter 1982). We propose the 
same relation at the micro level in as much as our model presents the gradual evolution of a 
firm as the outcome of the punctuated dynamics of groups which try to challenge the 
dominant routines. 
Finally, we consider that this punctuated transformation can take its source from the gradual 
modification of the practices or mental maps of individuals who, when the time comes, decide 
to contest the dominant rules. 
 
THE PARADOX OF THE DYNAMIC FIT 
 
In the 1970’s, contingency theory proposed different context-structure-performance 
relationships as good predictors of a firm’s performance (Pugh et al. 1969, Child 1972). 
Following this, we can assume that the firm that will be the most successful in the mid to long 
term is the one that has been the closest to the evolving requirements of its environment. This 
is not a trivial point when compared with the following dilemma: the greater the fit between a 
firm and its environment at a specific moment, the harder it will be for the firm to give up its 
ingrained routines when the environment begins to change. This dilemma is considered as the 
"paradox of the dynamic fit". 
We suggest that this is consistent in the social context with one of the laws proposed by 
Lamarck to explain change in animal life. He suggested that organs develop in proportion to 
their use. In respect of our discussion, exosomatic organs such as routines and sub-systems of 
routines operate in order to accomplish a specific function and are reinforced by their success. 
What is different between the animal and social contexts is the reason why an organ is used 
(and then developed). For animals, it is because this organ is used to satisfy a need. If the 
need disappears, the organ will regress. 
Thus, use and need are closely related, and this is the adaptive perspective adopted by Nelson 
and Winter as we previously suggested in the theoretical framework. 
On the other hand, in the context of social systems we consider that use and need are more 
ambiguously related. There is a remnant effect in the minds of members. A social system 
tends to persist with routines not only because they satisfy a present need, but also because 
they have been used to satisfy past needs. There are thus two interesting implications: first of 
all, the fact that past legitimacy can make up for a present lack of efficiency; and secondly, 
the fact that there is a great deal of ambiguity in the retrospective appreciation of the real 
reasons for success (Levitt and March, 1988). 
According to the law stated above, the system is reinforced. The routine is used because it is 
developed, and it develops because it is more widely used. 
The model shows a scenario where variation can be rejected at each stage of the evolutionary 
process. This internal failure of innovation makes the trajectory sensitive to the phenomenon 
of lock-in. 
A routine can be preserved because of a continuity process and remnant legitimacy. 
 
First, Simon proposes a mechanism of continuity [Simon, 1958] where attention and 
behaviour, once orientated toward a particular issue, tend to persist in the same manner for a 
long time. He adds that this is true even if the initial choice was of no particular strategic 
import, and this is particularly important for dissipative structures. Simon proposes three 
explanations for this tendency : 
− sunk costs 
− attention attracted toward continuity and achievement 
− restarting costs 
 
Secondly, the concept of remant legitimacy explains the lock-in phenomenon by itself. As 
Burgelman (1994) reports, Intel’s Geslach, vice-president of sales, complained that the board 
agreed to stay in DRAMS despite his argument that it wasn’t profitable. For a whole year the 
board refused to change its mind while losses piled up. Of course, Burgelman argues 
emotional attachment to previous product success and bounded rationality in the face of a 
highly rapidly changing environment. However, like him, we should like to stress that the 
previous option had maintained widespread legitimacy. The more often routines are used, the 
more often other members adopt them within the firm in order to legitimise their actions, as 
Wesphal et al. (1997) explained concerning the adoption of TQM at the meso level. We 
consider that it is possible to replicate this analysis at the micro level. The initial adopters 
used the routine because it was efficient. Then the following adopters did so, even if there 
was no particular gain in efficiency, simply in order to be assimilated to the norms. This is 
consistent with the “social traps” analysis (Platt, 1973). The consequences are therefore 
different according to whether they are considered in the context of a micro or a meso/macro 
innovation. At the meso level innovating firms fear imitators. The former have developed a 
competitive advantage and try to diffuse this throughout the firm; the latter hope to benefit 
from these efforts and try to erase this competitive advantage. Such pressure does reduce the 
life cycle of innovation [Mezias and Eisner, 1997].As far the institutionalisation of internal 
routines is concerned things do not function in the same way. If an innovator wants an 
innovation to be institutionalised (and then receive recognition and reputation as a payoff), he 
or she must do everything possible to encourage other members to use this solution. His or 
her efforts will be successful only if there is imitation. We are here in the presence of a 
competitive effort to impose a standard on a system of users. The more people who adopt the 
routine, the more legitimate it will become, and the more legitimate it is, the more people who 
will adopt it. In contrast to meso innovation, imitation does prolong the life of what becomes 
a standard procedure. The arrangement is stable i.e. able to absorb the shocks provoked by 
new solutions. The firm is on the point of being sanctioned by the external process of 
selection. 
The continuity process and the effects of previous legitimacy seem to be subjected to the 
reinforcement phenomenon when attention is not reoriented toward a new stage of “boundary 
repairing”. 
 
One can find at least three motives for reinforcement. The first is the easy access to 
previously chosen routines, the second is based on the previous efficiency of routines, and the 
third is linked to the sacrifice of internal fit to external fit, which thus tends to reinforce the 
self-referential backloops. 
 
First, a routine can be reinforced because of the number of its previous adopters. Members 
tend to use this routine because it has been rooted in the context and is now highly familiar 
within the organisation as a whole. This enables the routine to be adopted more easily. Here, 
the percolation image and Polya urns model is helpful in understanding how the system goes 
its own way without taking effective performance into consideration. 
Secondly, evolution can be attracted to a specific situation because of increasing income 
returns related to adoption, as shown with competency traps (Levitt and March, 1988). The 
payoff is based on the cumulative learning-by-doing that members carry out with established 
routines, which are then reinforced (Asquin 1995).  
The more familiar people are with routines, the faster these routines overcome other solutions 
when a new problem occurs. This learning orients the choices made in a zone of upheaval. 
No objective reason for the beginning of such a reinforcement process can be found other 
than what Schelling (1979) identifies as the "tyranny of small decisions". Owing to an array 
of favourable circumstances an organisation will accumulate more experience with one 
specific routine among many, and this will orient its subsequent trajectory. 
Thirdly, according to proposition 1, if the internal stretch required to achieve external fit has 
affected internal fit then members will propose more and more exotic alternatives which are 
no longer in accordance with the self-referential perspective of the firm. Then this chaotic 
tendency (Heiner 1983) will lead to inertia as a response and a lock-in phenomenon as a 
consequence. The system reproduces itself and there is less and less chance of its renewing 
itself since people are still convinced that the dominant practices are the best. This reinforces 
the legitimacy phenomenon, and so on. 
 
As pointed out in the field of organisational learning, it is necessary to unlearn in order to 
undertake new learning (Nystrom and Starbuck, 1984). This process is impeded by the lock-in 
phenomenon and this prevents the system from experiencing any creative destruction of 
routines. 
 
DESIGN OR TRAJECTORY: WHICH IS SUBJECT TO SELECTION ? 
 
Firms located in the same industry and functioning with similar resources (engineers from the 
same schools, an equivalent level of technology in the means of production, comparable 
organisational structures, similar legal status) can experience contrasted organisational and 
technological trajectories. 
Such diversity in organisation (static) and trajectories (dynamic) seems not to be a judicious 
issue for management sciences. The literature on strategy, for instance, takes diversity as a 
given, since without this diversity no specific strategy could occur. The research agenda is 
devoted to elaborating the tools capable of discovering new niches for firms and not to 
understanding where such diversity comes from. 
On the other hand, since the late 1960’s the contingency approach has considered that such 
dissimilarities reveal the fact that some firms are mistaken as to what they should be doing. 
The specific environment of a given industry implies certain requisite conditions and, as a 
consequence, all the firms within this industry should adopt the optimal arrangement of 
resources in order to respond to these requirements. There is perhaps no one best way, but 
there is always a better way to respond to the peculiar circumstances of this specific industry. 
The literature concentrates on discovering the right designs rather than seeking to explain 
such diversity, which need not be understood but simply corrected. 
Is “Why are there so many different organisational forms” such a trivial question? We 
consider this to be a highly relevant issue especially for evolutionary analysis, but few 
research programmes actually have it on their agenda (Davis 1996). 
The paradox of the dynamic fit supposes that diversity at a specific moment can not be 
subject to selection because the environment is looking for an ability to evolve in the mid to 
long term. This does not affect the contingency theory by itself if we admit that it is a static 
approach or, in other words, a theory about diagnosis and not about change (Lawrence and 
Lorsh, 1967). The consequences are much more interesting when we consider the ecology of 
population theory as an extension of the contingency theory, situated in a dynamic 
perspective. 
According to natural selection of the fittest, the ecology of population theory explains that a 
population tends to be homogenous. Owing to the “struggle for life” the least fit are pushed 
out of the industry. It can affect firms’ strategic portfolios or lead them to file for bankruptcy.  
If diversity exists, it is mainly in a sequential form renewed by the entry of new firms, since 
organisational evolution in the “living” population is supposed virtually impossible or too 
risky. Diversity is essential in order to regenerate the evolution process but it is still 
exogenous. There is no precise explanation of the mechanisms of variation. Selection is what 
the literature focuses on, and diversity is firmly in the background. 
But if we look at the general rather than the partial evolution of all the populations of all 
species, and if it is virtually impossible for an individual to create a new variation, then two 
questions have to be answered: first, where does original diversity comes from, and second, 
why does overall diversity not decline over time? At the population level selection operates 
only between existing variations but doesn’t explain variation itself. 
Spontaneous change in the blueprint of a particular firm is generally cited as an explanation of 
variation. This specific Darwinian mechanism allows the most appropriate changes to be 
selected and to be diffused among the population. Obviously, the problem is to understand 
what is spontaneous in the social sciences, and why these changes, rather than adaptive 
modifications, can occur. 
A major consequence is that the orientation of evolution, as in organic evolution, can hardly 
be anticipated (Low, 1995). There is clearly suspicion of the effective role of human 
consciousness and ability of people to drive their evolution, a position denounced in her own 
time by Penrose (1952). 
Two kinds of flexibility are in conflict here. The ecology of population theory deals with a 
static flexibility in which the firm makes choices which represent a renunciation of other 
alternatives and thus progressively diminishes its degree of freedom. For our part, we propose 
that the firm has an ability to create, select and institutionalise new alternatives. This dynamic 
flexibility is only affected if the firm is trapped by the mechanism of continuity which leads it 
constantly to seek the best fit. The arguments of the ecology of population theory concerning 
inertia are thus admissible at the extreme pole of a wide continuum of possibilities. However, 
these are not considered as the sole nor the main possibilities. 
As a consequence of this paradox, different designs can underpin equally successful 
trajectories while the same design can underpin both viable or defaulting trajectories at the 
same time. Selection operates between trajectories and not between designs. The principle of 
selection considered by the ecology of population theory is questioned. 
 
Proposition 4: The principle of selection put forward by the ecology of population theory is 
called into question by the paradox of dynamic fit. Thus we can consider that selection 
operates between trajectories and not between designs. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We have shown that endogenous variation can be understood within a model of self-
organising dissipative structures where an intricate network of “motors” is influenced by 
social groups. As a consequence, evolution is not necessarily self-sustaining, and the 
orientation of the trajectory will depend on social interactions. Members are responsible for 
variation but also for selection or retention.  
Hannan and Freeman’s conception of inertia is an extreme situation within a wide array of 
possibilities. It explains a situation in which the firm remains far removed from any zone of 
upheaval. This distance is analysed with social parameters i.e. inertia is not inevitable and can 
be managed.. 
 
Proposition 5 : Darwinian principles of evolution are considered as an extreme case of 
Lamarckian evolution. These two approaches should not be opposed but considered specific 
to particular circumstances. We only wish to suggest that an alternative Lamarkian approach 
explains regular evolution and that Darwinian theory is appropriate in explaining trapped 
evolution. Between these two positions we have the adaptive behaviour proposed by 
evolutionary economics. 
 
Proposition 6 : The dynamics of the situation are sustained if managers understand their role 
as institutionalising agents whose duty it is to increase the likelihood that the best processes 
and routines may thrive (Miner 1994). We can define such a role through the following three 
points: 
− First, top managers should accept that, within the present environment, disequilibrium can 
exist in the firm, and that this is essential in order to enable the firm to remain innovative 
as far as its response to the future environment is concerned (Smith and Gemmil, 1991); 
− second, managers have to get people and groups to be prepared to give up their innovative 
intents if the latter are not consistent with the self-referential vision of the firm; 
− Third, the firm as a collective should not be trapped by few well-established routines 
which incarnate all the learning, the attention, the resources and legitimacy of the past. 
Managers must develop new criteria of legitimacy and should orient the translation process 
in order to help people to understand the potential of new solutions for their current 
problems. 
 
Managers should not drive a specific change in order to obtain optimal fit for their 
organisation but should seek to pilot a trajectory which shows the best average proximity to 
the environment. This is a challenge for a new kind of management which, on the one hand, 
has to avoid allowing certain administrative innovations to become institutionalised as 
routines (even if top managers are considered as reactionary) and, on the other hand, develop 
a critical stance vis-à-vis the established system of legitimacy. This type of management 
consists in channelling organisational trajectories. 
Since organisational evolution is embedded in a specific trajectory (specific assets, 
cumulative learning, absorptive capacity) and moves like molasses according to the now 
famous remark by Herbert Simon, this discussion justifies the view that a firm tends to bring 
the environment closer to its possible zone of evolution in order to benefit from a better fit 
without weakening its dynamic flexibility. It is an ultimate variation on classical Lamarckism 
where individuals only adapt to environmental pressure. From our perspective, firms are 
supposed to be able to modify and to orient the nature of the constraints. Maybe that is the 
main difference between adaptive and innovative firms. 
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